\documentclass[12pt]{article}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
\usepackage[spanish]{babel}
\usepackage{hyperref}
\usepackage{geometry}
\geometry{margin=2.5cm}
\title{}
\author{\small Torres Ponce, Mariano Enrique}


\date{2026-04-15}

\begin{document}
\maketitle

\section*{Resumen}


\section*{Introducci\'on}
Everyday life is increasingly organized within digital environments that shape relevance, routes, and temporal rhythms without asserting visible authority. In this context, explicit coercion recedes and optimization takes its place, while legitimacy shifts away from command toward experienced utility. Technical systems configure the space of action through predefined parameters and default settings that operate in practice as governing forces. Consent becomes procedural, often reduced to repetition, and personalization absorbs conflict by aligning choices with preferences that the system itself has progressively formed.

\section*{Discusi\'on}
Critical scholarship has offered persuasive diagnoses of this transformation, yet it largely remains at the level of description. Panoptic metaphors and analyses focused on data extractivism identify symptoms but do not establish verifiable thresholds or remedies capable of being enforced. Law continues to operate in a declarative register while contemporary power is exercised through technical realization, which renders guarantees ineffective when they are not translated into features of design and operation. What remains insufficiently articulated is a category that distinguishes assisted automation from governance by design and that enables the authority of technical environments to be subjected to empirical scrutiny through falsifiable standards.

\section*{Objetivo}
This article advances the notion of operational power to capture that distinction. Operational power arises when legitimate action is parameterized in advance through default settings that channel conduct, when behavioral feedback recalibrates the environment without explicit notice, and when legitimacy is grounded in the smoothness of functioning rather than in justification. Only when these elements converge does governance by design acquire constitutive force. On this basis, the article develops material guarantees intended to restore a human interval and meaningful control without arresting innovation. Normative principles are translated into verifiable conditions of practical intelligibility, traceability sufficient for causal reconstruction, reversibility with bounded costs, and a proportionality that adjusts dynamically to risk and impact. The contribution is explicitly theoretical and normative in scope and does not claim to report original empirical datasets.

\section*{Metodolog\'ia}
An independent verification method is proposed as part of the system lifecycle rather than as a terminal form of control. Guided counterfactual auditing intervenes in defaults, frictions, and latency windows in a controlled manner to assess the channeling force of architectural choices. Failure, stress, and context change scenarios are examined to identify points at which reversibility erodes or consent loses substantive meaning, with particular attention to vulnerable populations and boundary conditions that average validations tend to obscure. In operational terms, metrics such as default adherence or reversibility gradients can be implemented by observing how frequently users remain on preconfigured paths when exit entails nontrivial costs, and by measuring the time, effort, or loss required to undo an automated outcome once it has taken effect. A minimal auditable archive preserves model versions, data routes, relevant system states, and chains of custody so that contested decisions can be reconstructed by third parties. These falsifiable metrics transform philosophical diagnosis into testable hypotheses, including default adherence as an indicator of environmental jurisdiction by design, reversibility gradients as a measure of effective undoing, effective opacity as the distance between declared behavior and reconstructable operation, and behavioral entropy reduction as a signal of narrowing trajectories without proportional gains in legitimate ends.

\section*{Resultados}
The proposed institutional implementation realigns incentives and redistributes capacities for control. Public and corporate procurement can require auditable archives from the outset, activation thresholds for safe shutdown and degradation, and provisions for third party verification under confidentiality. Governance structures separate design, operation, and supervision, assess effective human intervention rather than nominal oversight, and activate a right to deliberative latency that enables pauses, escalations, and reasonable disconnections. Formal recognition of default jurisdiction reflects the fact that defaults govern in practice and therefore require reinforced justification, non-discrimination testing, symmetric alternatives, and documented rationales. Interoperability and portability oriented toward performance equivalence prevent personalization from hardening into an exit barrier. The framework also incorporates a competition policy expressed in operational terms, addressing self-preferencing in ranking and relevance systems, integrations that close ecosystems, and access to interfaces and auditable logs for research and competitive scrutiny.

\section*{Conclusi\'on}
The contribution of the article is twofold. It offers a conceptual framework that distinguishes assisted automation from governance by optimization and an operational standard capable of translating principles into tests and remedies. Its originality lies in specifying material guarantees and falsifiable metrics that render limits enforceable in systems that modulate conduct through architecture rather than through explicit mandates. The legitimacy of technical environments cannot rest on functioning alone but must be supported by verifiable constraints that preserve a human interval and meaningful control. Where governance operates through optimization, guarantees must take the form of requirements of design, operation, and proof that any independent party can audit. Under these conditions, law recovers practical relevance in real time, innovation is shaped by responsibility, and operational power is contained without extinguishing the creative capacity needed to design freedoms rather than efficiencies alone.

\section*{Referencias}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Ananny, M.; Crawford, K. (2018). Seeing without knowing: Limitations of the transparency ideal and its application to algorithmic accountability. New Media and Society.

  \item Barocas, S.; Hardt, M.; Narayanan, A. (2019). Fairness and machine learning.

  \item Bobbio, N. (1991). El futuro de la democracia. Fondo de Cultura Económica.

  \item Castells, M. (1996). The rise of the network society. Blackwell.

  \item Deleuze, G. (1990). Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle. L Autre Journal.

  \item Edwards, L.; Veale, M. (2017). Slave to the algorithm? Why a right to an explanation is probably not the remedy you are looking for. Duke Law and Technology Review.

  \item Floridi, L. (2014). The fourth revolution: How the infosphere is reshaping human reality. Oxford University Press.

  \item Foucault, M. (1975). Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Gallimard.

  \item Han, B.-C. (2014). Psicopolítica: Neoliberalismo y nuevas técnicas de poder. Herder.

  \item Hildebrandt, M. (2015). Smart technologies and the end(s) of law: Novel entanglements of law and technology. Edward Elgar.

  \item Kroll, J. A.,; Huey, J.; Barocas, S.; Felten, E. W.; Reidenberg, J. R.; Robinson, D. G.; Yu, H. (2017). Accountable algorithms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 165.

  \item Lessig, L. (1999). Code and other laws of cyberspace. Basic Books.

  \item Mittelstadt, B. D.; Allo, P.; Taddeo, M.; Wachter, S.; Floridi, L. (2016). The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the debate. Big Data and Society.

  \item Morozov, E. (2013). To save everything, click here. PublicAffairs.

  \item Nissenbaum, H. (2004). Privacy as contextual integrity. Washington Law Review.

  \item Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society. Harvard University Press.

  \item Rouvroy, A.; Berns, T. (2013). Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives démancipation. Réseaux.

  \item Simondon, G. (1958). Du mode dexistence des objets techniques. Aubier.

  \item Stiegler, B. (2016). Dans la disruption: Comment ne pas devenir fou? Les Liens qui Libèrent.

  \item Thaler, R. H.; Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Yale University Press.

  \item Virilio, P. (1995). La vitesse de libération. Galilée.

  \item Wachter, S.; Mittelstadt, B.; Floridi, L. (2017). Why a right to explanation of automated decision-making does not exist in the General Data Protection Regulation. International Data Privacy Law.

  \item Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 109.

  \item Yeung, K. (2017). Hypernudge: Big data as a mode of regulation by design. Information, Communication and Society, 20.

  \item Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism. PublicAffairs.

\end{itemize}

\section*{Editorial}
Access the full text of article: \href{https://www.cyta.com.ar/ta/article.php?id=250203
}{https://www.cyta.com.ar/ta/article.php?id=250203
}\\
Publicado por la \textbf{Editorial Ciencia y T\'ecnica Administrativa - CyTA}.\\
Sitio web: \href{https://www.cyta.ar}{www.cyta.ar}\\
Email: \texttt{cyta@cyta.ar}


\end{document}